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The real defects in the system appear to lie more in the specifics
than in the generalities. At least part of the language is vague and
to some degree ambiguous. As proper cases arise, and real issues are
brought before the courts, it may be anticipated that some of these
early problems will be settled. It is expected that the legislature
will continue to improve the law. In any event, in its basic outlines,
the law has, to date, successfully withstood constitutional attack.
John L. Roche
James C. Rothwell
EFFECT OF STATE MARITAL LAWS ON "WIDOW'S"
BENEFITS UNDER THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT
I. INTROUCTION
This note concerns one part of the voluminous Social Security
Act: Subchapter H-Federal Old-Age, Survivors and Disability In-
surance Benefits.1 Although the persons entitled to benefits under
this Subchapter include those who meet the requirements of wife,
child, widower, widow, or parent of the wage earner, this note is
confined to the widow's Survivors benefits2 and examines:
(1) The reference to state law to determine "widow's" status;
(2) The effect of this reference upon her right to benefits;
(3) The recent congressional amendments to the act which con-
cern the problem;3 and,
(4) The impact of state law upon the right to reinstatement of
benefits after annulment of subsequent remarriage.4
A. Nature of Benefits
The theory behind the widow's monthly benefits is the substitu-
tion of Social Security benefits for the economic loss resulting from
the death of the wage earner, thus keeping the widow from becom-
ing a public charge or undue burden upon her family.5
The right to benefits is in no way connected with need or wealth;
a widow of a wealthy man as well as a widow of a poor man may
2 49 STAT. 622 (1935), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-25 (1958).
242 U.S.C.A. § 402 (e) (Supp. 1962). The benefits are of two types: monthly
pensions and lump-sum death payments. The lump-sum death payments are
relatively unimportant; therefore, this note is primarily concerned with the
monthly pension.
3 74 STAT. 924 (1960); 71 STAT. 519 (1957), amending 42 U.S.C. § 416
(h) (1).
4 By analogy the problems and rights of widows discussed in this note apply
to widowers as well. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 402(f), 416(g) (Supp. 1962).
5 See Stuart v. Hobby, 128 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Newsom v. Social
Security Board, 70 F. Supp. 962 (E.D. Mich. 1947).
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receive benefits as long as the husband was covered by Social Se-
curity and the widow qualifies under the act.6
The benefits under the Social Security system are distributed pur-
suant to the power of Congress to tax and spend money in aid of
the "general welfare."7 In Helvering v. Davis' the United States
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the benefits on the
basis that unemployment is a general national ill which Congress
has power to check?
The widow's monthly benefits under the system are in the nature
of social insurance. In fact, the benefits under Subchapter II are tided
Old-Age Insurance Benefits, but the insurance designation is mis-
leading because the benefits are non-contractual in nature," al-
though the terms "insured," "insurance" and "beneficiary" are used
throughout the act. Nor are the benefits vested property rights to
which one may succeed."
The funds necessary to provide these benefits are derived from
mandatory deductions from the wages of each wage earner who is
covered by the Social Security system. These deductions constitute an
employment tax, a part of the Internal Revenue Code,'" and have
been declared constitutional in Steward Machine Co. v. Davis.'
The designation of the deductions as tax rather than as contribu-
tions to a pension fund or as an insurance contract eliminates any
community property right a widow might otherwise claim.'4
II. DETERMINATION OF "WIDOW'S" STATUS
The Social Security tax is uniform throughout the United States,
and it would seem, therefore, that the right to widow's benefits would
also be uniform throughout the United States. This is not the case.
The lack of uniformity exists because the widow's benefits depend
upon the marital status of the wage earner and the claimant; but
6 42 U.S.C.A. §-402(e) (1) (Supp. 1962).
7 Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
8 301 U.S. 619 (1936).
9) UNITED STATES CONST. ART. I, § 8.
10 Bernstein v. Pibicoff, 192 F. Supp. 138 (E.D. Pa. 1961) aff'd, 299 F.2d 248
(3rd Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 887 (1962); Price v. Flemming, 280
F. 2d 956 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 817 (1961).
"1 Kaplin v. Flemming, 190 F. Supp. 526 (E.D.N.Y. 1961); Boston v. Folsom,
158 F. Supp. 112 (E.D.N.Y. 1957).
12 INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, §§ 3101, 3111 as amended.
14 301 U.S. 548 (1936).
13 In California if insurance premium payments are made with community
funds, the proceeds of the policy are community property to one-half of
which the widow has a right. This right is superior to that of any designated
beneficiary. Estate of Wedemeyer, 109 Cal. App. 2d 67, 240 P. 2d 8 (1952);
cf. Allie Estate, 50 Cal. 2d 794, 329 P. 2d 903 (1958); Wissner v. Wissner,
338 U.S. 655, reversing 89 Cal. App. 2d 759, 201 P. 2d 837 (1949).
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there is no federal domestic relations law, and the act as originally
passed and as amended has failed to define such terms as "mar-
riage" and "remarriage." Therefore, marital status is determined by
reference to various state laws, and the right to widow's benefits is
decided by the state laws governing such matters as intestate succes-
sion, annulment, divorce and marriage.
The fact that reference to state law may result in varying applica-
tion of a federal statute was recognized in Nott v. Folsoml' where
the court held that reference must be made to state law to determine
status, and that the correction of any inequities because of such ap-
plication was a matter for congressional consideration, for the
courts were not empowered to define the language of the act, legislat-
ing where Congress had failed to do so.
Once the decision is made that reference must be to state law for
the purpose of determining marital status, the next question is:
Which state law? The act itself provides the answer to this ques-
tion by directing reference to the entire law of the state, including
its conflict of laws rules. If the state court would find that: (1)
claimant and deceased wage earner were validly married, or (2) if
not validly married, then such claimant would nevertheless be
deemed a widow for Social Security purposes if she would, under
the laws applied by the state courts in determining the devolution
of intestate personal property, have the same status with respect to
taking of such property as a legal widow.'6
Prior to 1957 status as a lawful widow would not alone entitle
claimant to widow's benefits; she needed also to qualify under state
law as the heir to the intestate personal property of the wage
earner.
7
This is illustrated in Kandelin v. Social Security Board8 where
the marital domicile was New York, and a New York statute provided
that "no distributive share of the estate of a decedent shall be allowed
under the provisions of this article.., to a wife who has abandoned
her husband." The court held that the widow, although validly mar-
ried, was not entitled to recover death benefits under the act.
Under the present wording of 42 U.S.C. section 416(h) (1) (A)
the Kandelin holding would not be controlling because the right to
'5 Nott v. Folsom, 161 F. Supp. 905 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). It is of interest that in
Pearsall v. Folsom, 138 F. Supp. 939 (N.D. Cal. 1956), aff'd, 245 F. 2d
562 (9th Cir., 1957) the Social Security Agency argued that interpretation
should be without reference to state law, and in the Nott case it asserted the
opposite position.
16 42U.S.C.A. §416(h)(1)(A) (Supp. 1962).
17 Kandelin v. Kandelin, 45 F. Supp. 341 (E.D.N.Y. 1942).
18 136 F. 2d 327 (2d Cir. 1943).
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intestate personal property is not an essential requirement, but is
an alternative means of qualifying in case no valid marriage is de-
termined by the laws of the state of domicile. Thus, the two require-
ments, valid marriage and right to intestate succession, are now dis-
junctive and not conjunctive as they were prior to 1957.19
The question arises, whether the purpose behind the widow's bene-
fits-to alleviate economic distress resulting from the wage
earner's death-is vitiated by making these two requirements al-
ternatives. Certainly under the present wording of the section the
widow in the Kandelin case would be entitled to Social Security
benefits even though she had abandoned her husband and was in no
way dependent upon him. Is this not giving the lawful widow a
vested right to benefits subject to divestment only by amendment or
repeal of the act?
A. California Law Re Putative Spouse
'"A putative marriage is one which has been contracted in good faith
and in ignorance of some existing impediment on the part of at
least one of the contracting parties.... e
At common law a putative spouse was given no rights in the mari-
tal property, but the rules of community property are different.
Some community property states hold that a "community" can exist
even though the marriage is void at law.2' California, however,
requires a valid marriage to create a true community, but accom-
plishes the same result by the equitable doctrine of quasi-community
property.12 Under California law, if a woman enters into a cere-
monial marriage in good faith believing the marriage valid, then she
is a putative spouse; and upon the death of her spouse, or prior
dissolution of the marriage, she is entitled to the same share in the
quasi-community property as a de jure wife would have had in true
community property. If the spouse died intestate, the putative spouse
is entitled to all of the property which would have been community
property of a valid marriage."
1. Where Estate Consists Only of Quasi-Community Property
In Speedling v. Hobby24 the applicant for Social Security bene-
fits and the decedent, after obtaining interlocutory California divorce
19 Amended by 71 STAT. 519 (1957), 42 U.S.C. § 416(h) (1) (1958).
20 U.S. Fidelity & Guarantee Co. v. Henderson, 53 S.W. 2d 811, 816 (Tex.
Civ. App., 1932).
21 Texas Co. v. Stewart, 101 So. 2d 222 (La., 1958); Funderburk v. Funder-
burk, 214 La. 717, 38 So. 2d 502 (1949); Smith v. Smith, 1 Tex. 621, 46
Am. Dec. 121 (1846); 1 DE FuNAx, PRImCILES OF CoAvruNrrY haoPERTY
§ 56 (1943).
22 Schneider v. Schneider, 183 Cal. 335, 191 Pac. 533 (1920); Estate of Krone,
83 Cal. App. 2d 766, 189 P. 2d 741 (1948).
23 Estate of Krone, supra note 22.
24 132 F. Supp. 833 (N.D. Cal. 1955).
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decrees from their respective spouses, married in Arizona prior to
entry of final decrees. They subsequently treated the marriage as
valid. All of the decedent husband's property was acquired during
this marriage. The claimant, under California law, was entitled to
take the same share of intestate personal and real property as a law-
ful widow, and thus was entitled to Social Security insurance bene-
fits. It should be noted that the court did not hold that a putative
wife is a lawful wife, but rather is a person viewed by state law to
be equivalent for certain purposes; and for purposes of Social Se-
curity, claimant does not have to be the lawful widow of the de-
cedent, but only must have the same status relative to taking in-
testate personal property as a lawful widow.
2. Where Estate Consists of Quasi-Community
Property and Separate Property
In Aubrey v. Folsom5 the court goes even further than in the
Speedling case and holds that the putative widow need not have
the same status as a lawful widow with respect to all classes of de-
ceased wage earner's intestate personal property under applicable
state law in order to qualify for benefits under the Social Security
Act. Since California law gives the putative spouse a right of succes-
sion in all of the quasi-community property in the estate of the de-
ceased wage earner, she was entitled to benefits under the act, even
though the deceased wage earner left separate personal property in
his estate and California law did not grant her succession rights in
such property.
In the Aubrey case the Secretary " contended that the California
courts recognize the putative spouse for equitable reasons only and
grant her a share in the estate of the intestate putative spouse as a
rule of equity and not as a rule of intestate succession. Under this
theory the putative spouse would not have the status of widow with-
in the meaning of 42 U.S.C.A. section 416 (h) (1). However, the
court ruled against the Secretary and held that under California law
the surviving spouse inherits all of the community property of an
intestate spouse,2 7 and that the California Probate law has been ex-
pressly held applicable to the surviving putative spouse, 8 thereby
giving the putative spouse a right of inheritance in all quasi-com-
munity property.
In the Speedling case the court held that a putative widow satis-
fied the requirements of 42 U.S.C.A. section 416 (h) (1) where the
25 151 F. Supp. 836 (N.D. Cal. 1957).
26 Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare.
27 CAL. PROB. CoDE § 201.
28 Estate of Krone, 83 Cal. App. 2d 766, 189 P. 2d 741 (1948).
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deceased wage earner left only quasi-community property. The court
expressly left open the question of whether the putative widow would
qualify if the estate also included separate property. The Aubrey
case settled this point by holding that under the regulations it is
sufficient that the applicant be treated as a widow, although not
technically endowed with that status, for the purpose of sharing in the
estate, and that if the applicant is treated as standing in a widow's
relationship for any purpose under the state law of intestate succes-
sion such applicant would qualify under 42 U.S.C.A. section 416
(h) (1).
B. "tFederal" Putative Spouse
Prior to the Social Security Amendments of 19609 in states
which did not recognize the succession rights of a putative spouse,
this could happen: A woman who had lived with the wage earner for
many years, believing that her marriage was valid, might discover
only after his death that the marriage was invalid. She would not be
entitled to Social Security widow's benefits even though the wage
earner had been taxed annually.
Recognizing the inequities resulting from these differences in
state laws and endeavoring to make the right to benefits uniform
and to more nearly accomplish the purpose of providing economic aid
to surviving dependents of a deceased wage earner, Congress in 1960
amended 42 U.S.C.A. section 416(h) (1) so that the section be-
came 42 U.S.C.A. section 416(h) (1) (A) and added a new section,
42 U.S.C.A. section 416 (h) (1) (B). 30
This amendment leaves the initial determination of status to state
law, but if under both standards in subparagraph (A) the claimant
29 74 STAT. 924 (1960).
3o Social Security Amendments of 1960, 74 STAT. 924, 951; 42 U.S.C.A. §
416(h)(1) (Supp. 1962) "(A) An applicant is the.. widow ... forpur-
poses of this subchapter if the courts of the State in which such insured in-
dtividual is domiciled ... at the time of death... would find that such appli-
cant and such insured individual were validly married at the time ...he
died. If such courts would not find that such applicant and such insured
individual were validly married at such time, such applicant shall, nevertheless
be deemed to be the . . . widow . . . of such insured individual if such
applicant would, under the laws applied by such courts in determining the
devolution of intestate personal property, have the same status with respect
to the taking of such property as a... widow ... of such insured individual.
"(B) In any case where under subparagraph (A) an applicant is not (and
is not deemed to be) the . . . widow . . .of a fully or currently insured
individual . . ., but it is established to the satisfaction of the Secretary
that such applicant in good faith went through a marriage ceremony with
such individual resulting in a purported marriage between them which, but
for a legal impediment not known to the applicant at the time of such cere-
mony, would have been a valid marriage, and such applicant and the in-
sured individual were living in the same household at the time of the death
of such insured individual .. .then .. . such purported marriage shall be
deemed to be a valid marriage...
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would not be a widow or deemed a widow under applicable state
law, then the Secretary is given the discretion to allow the claimant
Social Security benefits if it is established to the Secretary's satis-
faction"' that:
(1) such claimant in good faith went through a marriage cere-
mony;
(2) but for a legal impediment, 2 not known to the claimant
at the time of such ceremony, it would have been a valid mar-
riage;
(3) such claimant and insured individual were living in the
same household at the time of death of the insured individual;
and
(4) no other person is or has been entitled to the benefits.
This 1960 amendment was a significant step in the direction of
uniformity of benefits throughout the United States, for now, except
in cases of marriages entered into with knowledge of invalidity,
the ultimate decision as to benefits may be determined by one fed-
eral standard rather than by varying state laws regarding what is or
is not a valid marriage or the state laws of intestate succession.
The wording of the amendment would indicate that any state
decision as to what constitutes good faith or lack of it on the part
of the claimant would not be binding upon the Secretary, for when
interpreting federal legislation, neither the Secretary nor the federal
courts would be bound by the Erie R.R. v. Tompkins"3 decision to
follow state substantive law. Cases under the Social Security Act re-
I1 1 P-H Soc. SEc. I[ 31, 428A, Reg. 4, § 404.708a (app'd. 1-3-63; filed 1-8-63),
lists the evidence required for a valid marriage under 42 U.S.C. § 416
(h)(1)(B): "An applicant whose status as a ... widow. .of the insured
individual upon whose earnings the claim is based depends upon a purported
marriage to such individual which is deemed to be a valid marriage ...
shall submit, in order to establish ... her status as such, evidence consisting
of the following:
(a) Evidence of a ceremonial marriage...; and
(b) Applicant's signed statement as to whether ... she went through the
marriage ceremony in good faith, believing that the marriage was valid at
the time it was entered into, as to whether . . .she knew of the impedi-
ment to the marriage (e.g. an undissolved prior marriage) at such time
and the reasons for.., her belief that the marriage was valid; and
(c) "0"*0*0
(d) Upon request, if the applicant's marriage to the insured individual is
invalid because of a prior undissolved marriage, and the prior spouse is
living and his (or her) whereabouts are known, a signed statement from
such spouse showing whether applicant, at the time the marriage ceremony
was entered into, knew of the prior marriage and knew that it bad not
been dissolved; and showing the basis for his (or her) awareness of the
applicant's knowledge of these facts; and
(e) *0*0*0*0"
32 (1) Previous undissolved marriage, or (2) defect in procedure followed in
connection with such purported marriage. 42 U.S.C.A. § 416 (h)(1)(B)
(Supp. 1962).
33 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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garding survivor's benefits involve interpretation of a federal stat-
ute. In such interpretation the federal courts are not required by
the Erie doctrine to follow the interpretation given to a state stat-
ute.84 The federal courts interpret the Social Security Act liberally to
accomplish the intent of Congress.
85
C. Summary
At the present time an applicant for widow's benefits may ac-
quire widow's status for Social Security purposes if: (1) courts of
the state of domicile of the wage earner at time of his death would
find that he and applicant were validly married, or (2) if not
validly married, the applicant would nevertheless be deemed a
widow if the same state courts would give her the same status as
a lawful widow in determining the devolution of intestate personal
property, or (3) it is established to the satisfaction of the Secretary
of Health, Education and Welfare that such applicant in good faith
went through a marriage ceremony with the wage earner, which, but
for a legal impediment, would have been a valid marriage, and such
applicant and insured individual were living in the same household
at the time of the death of the insured. The latter provision elimi-
nates a disparity which existed until 1960 between persons claim-
ing benefits as widows in states which did not recognize property
rights in a putative spouse and inhabitants of states which did recog-
nize those rights.
III. REINSTATEMENT OF WIDOW'S BENEFITS AFTER
ANNULMENT OF REMARRIAGE
Once it has been determined that the claimant meets the status
of widow for Social Security purposes under 42 U.S.C.A. section
416(h) (1) and 42 U.S.C.A. section 416(c),36 she must then satisfy
84 See United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704 (1947); Beaverdale Memorial Park
v. United States, 47 F. Supp. 663 (D.C. Conn. 1942).
85 Sparks v. United States, 153 F. Supp. 909 (D.C.D. Vt. 1957); Schroeder v.
Hobby, 222 F. 2d 713 (10th Cir. 1955); Ray v. Social Security Board, 73
F. Supp. 58 (S.D. Ala. 1947).
ss 42 U.S.C.A. § 416 (c) (Supp. 1962): "The term 'widow' (except when used
in section 402 (i) . . .) means a surviving wife of an individual, but only
if (1) she is the mother of his son or daughter, (2) she legally adopted his
son or daughter while she was married to him and while such son or daughter
was under the age of eighteen, (3) he legally adopted her son or daugh-
ter while she was married to him and while such son or daughter was under
the age of eighteen, (4) she was married to him at the time both of them
legally adopted a child under the age of eighteen, (5) she was married
to him for a period of not less than one year immediately prior to the day
on which he died, or (6) in the month prior to the month of her marriage
to him (A) she was entitled to, or on application therefor and attainment
of age 62 in such prior month would have been entitled to, benefits under
subsection (e) or (h) of section 402 of this title, or (B) she had attained
age eighteen and was entitled to, or on application therefor would have been
entitled to, benefits under subsection (d) of such section."
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the requirements of 42 U.S.C.A. section 402 (e) (1) " to receive the
monthly benefits. Let us assume that the widow has satisfied all of
these requirements, has been receiving the monthly benefits, remar-
ries, benefits are stopped, and later the remarriage is annulled. She
then applies for reinstatement of her former Social Security widow's
benefits."8 Will she be allowed such reinstatement? The answer to
this question depends upon whether or not she has "remarried."
Here again state law will affect the answer because the Social Se-
curity Act has failed to define "remarriage" for Social Security
purposes.
In interpreting the requirement "has not remarried"3 the word
"remarried" has been held4" to mean that a valid marriage contract
has been entered into.
A. Void and Voidable Marriages
If the state of domicile declares the remarriage to be void there
is no problem as a void marriage is never a marriage; therefore, the
Social Security benefits would be reinstated. In such a case the de-
cree of annulment by the court is merely to record the fact.4 But
problems develop with marriages which are merely voidable. Void-
able marriages remain valid until annulled by a court of competent
jurisdiction because of a legal impediment which existed at the
time the marriage was entered into.4" Again, differences in the laws
of the states lead to varying results in the reinstatement of widow's
benefits.
An analogy exists between voidable marriages and voidable con-
tracts. When rescinded, a contract becomes a nullity and the parties
may be restored to the relative positions which they would have
occupied had no contract been entered into.43 As a general rule this
is true also of a voidable marriage which has been annulled by the
court for, unless otherwise provided by statute, a decree of nullity
relates back so as to render the marital relation of the parties void
from its inception.44
87 The only requirement pertinent to our discussion is the first one: A widow
shall be entitled to receive widow's insurance benefits if she 'as not re-
married." 42 U.S.C.A. § 402 (e)(1)(A) (1957).
88 E.g., Santuelli v. Folsom, 165 F. Supp. 224 (N.D. Cal. 1958).
39 See supra note 37.
10 Sparks v. United States, 153 F. Supp. 909 (D.C.D. Vt. 1957).
41 See Yeager v. Flemming, 173 F. Supp. 316 (S.D. Fla. 1959).
42 CAL. CIv. CODE § 82 lists six grounds: Underage, previous husband living,
unsound mind, fraud, force, and physical incapacity.
43 5 CoRBiN, CoNRAcTs § 1105 (1951 ed.).
44 55 C.J.S., Marriage, § 68. See also Pearsall v. Folsom, 138 F. Supp. 939
(N.D. Cal. 1956), aff'd. 245 F. 2d 562 (9th Cir. 1957); Santuelli v. Fol-
som, 165 F. Supp. 224 (N.D. Cal. 1958).
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However, annulment proceedings should be classified as sui gen-
enis, for although a judgment of nullity is conclusive against the par-
ties to the action and those claiming under them, it is not necessarily
so against innocent third parties.45 In the case of third parties, the
status between marriage and annulment continues to be a factor, even
after annulment, in determining the legal effect of all that occurred
during that period. 6 The effect on such matters as legitimacy of
children, obligations of a former husband to continue alimony pay-
ments, privileged communications, and reinstatement of Social Se-
curity benefits are but a few examples.
For the purpose of determining the effect as to third persons the
courts apply a doctrine of "relation back," a legal fiction, limiting
the application of the doctrine when policy and justice so require.
The doctrine simply operates to make the annulment effective as
of the date the marriage was celebrated; thus the marriage is held
to be void ab initio.
The doctrine of "relation back" was enunciated by Mr. Justice
Cardozo in Sleicher v. Sleicher" a case involving the question of
reinstatement of a first husband's alimony payments after annulment
of his former wife's second marriage. In Sleicher, the court held that
the annulment of the voidable marriage made the marriage void ab
initio as between the parties, meaning that the wife in the annulled
marriage had never remarried, and required the first husband to re-
sume alimony payments as directed by the previous divorce decree.
However, the court limited the application of the doctrine by hold-
ing that the nullity of the second marriage did not relate back to
render the first husband in default for the alimony payments from the
date of the remarriage to the date of the annulment. To do so would
have the effect of laying "upon innocence the opprobrium of guilt."4
The doctrine of "relation back" would defeat its purpose if used to
change the quality of intervening acts of strangers. 9
In arriving at its decision the court no doubt was influenced by
the common law rule that a wife in an annulled marriage was not
entitled to support from the husband in the annulled marriage, and
also by the policy behind the requirement of alimony, to provide
support of the divorced wife who would otherwise become a burden
upon the state."
The doctrine of "relation back" was employed in New York until
1940 when the state departed from the common law rule by the en-
4r CAL. CIV. CODE § 86.
40 Pearsall v. Folsom, supra note 44.
47 251 N.Y. 366, 167 N.E. 501 (1929).
48 Id. 167 N.E. at 502.
49 For a discussion of the "relation back" doctrine see 7 Stan. L. Rev. 529.
GO See Sparks v. United States, 153 F. Supp. 909 (D.C.D. Vt. 1957).
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actment of a statute 1 which authorized courts to decree support of
the wife by the husband in the annulled marriage, thereby remov-
ing the need for the application of the "relation back" doctrine as it
affected alimony payments by the first husband. 2
The effect of the New York statute was to give the wife in a void-
able marriage rights similar to those conferred by divorce.
What effect does this statute and similar statutes in other states
have upon reinstatement of the widow's Social Security benefits?
1. Minority View
In Nott v. Folsom3 the marital domicile was New York. The
federal court denied reinstatement of Social Security benefits after
annulment, holding that under the New York statute a voidable
marriage, annulled on the ground of fraud, is not void ab initio. The
wife was entitled to support from the husband in the annulled mar-
riage and it was immaterial that the wife in this case did not apply
for support as she might have under New York Civil Practice Act
section 1140-a.
In Yeager v. Flemming 4 the marital domicile was Connecticut.
The court denied reinstatement of benefits, citing and following the
Nott decision that for Social Security purposes the annulled marriage
had been a remarriage. The Connecticut statute" allowed the court
to decree support to the wife in an annulled marriage. The court
felt that a voidable marriage, even though void ab initio as to the
parties, continues to have sufficient validity on which to base a sup-
port decree, and therefore is a "remarriage" for Social Security pur-
poses.
In both Nott and Yeager the ratio decidendi of the court in deny-
ing reinstatement of benefits was not that the wife received sup-
port,"0 but that there was in the state of domicile a statute giving
the annulled voidable marriage some validity, which was enough to
hold that for Social Security purposes the widow had remarried.
2. Majority View
California does not have a statute like those of New York and
Connecticut, but follows the majority view which applies the "rela-
51 CPA § 1140-a (now CPLR, Domestic Relations Law art. 13, § 236).
52 Connecticut, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Washington and West Virginia
have this type of statute. See Annot., 4 A.L.R. 926, 939 (1919); Annot.,
54 A.L.R. 2d 1410 (1957).
53 161 F. Supp. 905 (S.D. N.Y. 1958).
54 173 F. Supp. 316 (S.D. Fla. 1959).
55 GEN. STAT. CoNN. § 7341 (rev. 1949).
56 In the Nott case the wife of the annulled marriage had not applied for or
received any support, and in the Yeager case the wife received a lump-
sum payment of $3,000 which represented monies she expended for her
own support during the annulled marriage.
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don back" doctrine. However, its application is not mandatory or con-
clusive as to any person except the parties to the marriage and those
claiming under them, and it is employed at the discretion of the court
when doing so conforms to sanctions of sound policy and justice."
In Social Security Act cases the courts apply the doctrine to further
the intended purpose of the Act, i.e., to provide economic relief to
widows upon the death of the wage earner.
This majority view is based upon the common law rule that a wife
who sued for annulment was not entitled to support from the hus-
band in the annulled marriage; the theory being that the wife was
denying the existence of the marriage which was the basis of her
right to support."8
Thus, in the majority of states Social Security benefits will be re-
instated after annulment of the subsequent marriage because the an-
nulment relates back, making the remarriage void ab initio; this is
true even though the state court ruled that the doctrine of "relation
back" will not operate to revive the first husband's alimony obliga-
tion which was terminable upon the wife's remarriage.5 " This is so
because as to strangers to the remarriage the "relation back" doc-
trine is discretionary and can operate for certain purposes and not for
others. 0
IV. CONCLUSION
Whether or not a claimant for widow's benefits under the Social
Security Act will receive those benefits is determined by reference
to state law since the act itself does not define such terms as "mar-
riage" and "remarriage." Because the marital laws of the states are
not uniform the results under the Social Security Act are also not
uniform.
The Social Security Amendment of 1960 which established a
"federal putative marriage" standard removed inequities in results
between states which did not recognize marital property rights of
the putative spouse and those which did.
Inequities will occur, however, regarding reinstatement of bene-
fits after annulment of a voidable remarriage. Congress should de-
fine in the Social Security Act what constitutes a "remarriage" for
the purpose of reinstatement of widow's benefits. This is because state
statutes, allowing state courts to decree support to the wife in an
annulled marriage, have been the basis for denial of reinstatement
57 Sefton v. Sefton, 45 Cal. 2d 872, 291 P. 2d 439 (1955).
58 See Annot., 110 A.L.R. 1290 (1937).
59 See supra, note 57.
60 Santuelli v. Folsom, 165 F. Supp. 224 (N.D. Cal. 1958).
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of widow's benefits. (The courts do not reason that it is the avail-
ability of support which is controlling, but speak in terms of such
an annulled marriage having sufficient validity to preclude resump-
tion of benefits.) In this area Congress should act to standardize rights
to benefits throughout the United States.
Edna D. Barber
FORMAL AND DOCTRINAL DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE CONTRACTS
I. INTRODUCTION
Justice Holmes admonishes us that "men must turn square corners
when they deal with the Government."' This "Square Corner Doc-
trine" finds application in the extensive and expanding area of gov-
ernment contracting. This note surveys briefly some ways in which
a contract between the United States Government and a private
businessman or corporation may be at variance with a contract be-
tween private parties based upon common law principles.
II. DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND
PRIVATE CONTRACT TERMS
A. Sovereign Immunity
Most areas of dissimilarity between government contracts and pri-
vate commercial contracts involve mandatory clauses which are in-
serted into the government contract and which a contractor must
accept if it chooses to do business with the government. However,
one obvious dissimilarity derives from the nature of one of the con-
tracting parties. This is the immunity of the sovereign to suit by
the contractor. The doctrine of sovereign immunity has the effect of
limiting the contractor's legal remedy for breach of contract by the
government to such situations and to such forums as the government
chooses.' The parties to a private contract need not contend with
such a defense.
Prior to 1855 a government contractor's legal remedy for breach
of contract by the government was limited to congressional action.
The Act of 1855' constituted a definitive step in the limitation of
the doctrine of sovereign immunity by establishing the Court of
I Rock Island, A.L.R. Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 141, 143 (1920).
2 See e.g., Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354 (1918); Goodyear Tire and
Rubber Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 287 (1927).
3 10 STAT. 612.
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